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STRATEGIC STRAIN: SECURITY DILEMMAS FACING THE CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR

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ABSTRACT

Many nations depend much on China's One Belt and One Road project. Furthermore quite dependent on this project are Pakistan and China. Still, the One Belt, One Road project poses several security issues for China and Pakistan that need to be satisfactorily addressed using deftness and success. To guarantee the proper implementation of this project, security is a major threat that has to be taken care of right after its end. This study will look at security issues' dynamics and effects in respect to the western CPEC Corridor. Solving the proximity of the western route to Afghanistan and FATA will help to maximize the benefits of the CPEC. There are argued both internal and external challenges for this megaproject.

Keywords: Insurgency, Gwadar Port, India-Pakistan rivalry, Afghanistan-Pakistan border issues, Security assessments for CPEC projects

Introduction

Since 1950, Pakistan and China (PRC) both sovereign nations have kept friendly and strong ties. Pakistan's acceptance of Communist China marks the proof of a cemented and long-lasting partnership. This is a truth: both sovereign governments have made significant contributions to the common 520 KM border notwithstanding their ideological differences. Deeply ingrained in China's past is her military, political, and financial backing for Pakistan in improving its nuclear capabilities to offset Indian animosity throughout the whole area (Vandewalle, 2015). In the constitutional and political annals of Pakistan, the Chinese president was the first to speak before the combined session of the Pakistani parliament. During his visits to Pakistan on April 20 and 21, 2015, Xi Jinping paid his great obeisance. Apart from the fact that Islamabad will always be with us in difficult times when China stands alone, President of China, Xi Jinping, confirmed that "Pakistan-China struggles have brought their minds and hearts jointly close together." Declared by Pakistan's Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, the two countries are "truly iron brothers." Two Pakistani brothers have really signed 51 Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) totaling \$41.30 billion for the CPEC megaproject (Vandewalle, 2015). Originally envisioned as a means of attaining complete connectivity, Li Keqiang, the premier of China, first saw the mega-development plan of CPEC in 2013. In 2013 the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was Nawaz Sharif, President of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). Stability of the Pakistani economy was his main goal. This was achieved with the signing of 51 memoranda of understanding in several spheres of involvement for 46 billion dollars in multi-dimensional CPEC projects with China (Stevens, 2015). The Asian Development Bank has set aside \$8 billion to build railway tracks from the province capital of Sindh to Karachi and from the province capital of KPK to Peshawar. Chinese investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) amounts to the whole foreign direct investment (FDI) flood into Pakistan in 1970 (Rakisits,

2015).

The CPEC changes game and destiny as well as a fate. It will comprise a 2,000-kilometer transit link from Kashgar in north-western Beijing to the deep ocean port of Gwadar, which borders Iran. Following the successful completion of this plan, the Middle Eastern effluent oil resources would be overwhelmed at the port of Gwadar, at the outer entrance of the Gulf. China might transport these fuels via the Baluchistan province and the huge Karakoram mountains. On the world map, Islamabad is located in a somewhat strategically important area. Still, it is also located at the junction of nations with limited energy resources and those with plenty of them. Generally speaking, it connects to the Gulf of Persia on one side and gives access to the balmy sea, so indirectly the non-coastal states on the other. Islamabad's geo-strategic significance is also clear from its surrounds, which include China, India, and other nation states wealthy in natural riches such Iran, Afghanistan, and central Asian states, all submerged economic colossi (Bilal, 2014).

Stephen Cohen's book, *The Geostrategic Significance of Pakistan*, shows that Pakistan's geo-graphical location has been judged to have the greatest advantages and that it has the richest resource region in the North-West and North-East. He also points out that Pakistan has had unfair treatment in history. The overland CPEC route links southern Pakistan's Gwadar seaport to Kashgar, a city in northern-western China. Upgrading a number of connections—including railroads, roadways, oil pipelines, and natural gas—helps to accomplish this. Still, the whole operationalization of CPEC has made it the gateway for trade between China, the Middle East, and Africa (Tiezzi, 2014).

Geographic location defines the position and purpose of a nation-state in global politics. It indicates, from the angles of politics, society, and economics, the degree of benefits or drawbacks for the country, state, or other states. On Earth, Pakistan occupies the most important geographical point. Actually, it is found at the junction of energy-sufficient and energy-scarce regimes. Pakistan's proximity to the world's rising economies—including China, Russia, India, and other rich in natural resources states like Afghanistan and Iran—makes clear its geo-strategic relevance (Mahmood, 2015; Daily Times, 2017). Security remains the fundamental issue for the whole establishment and realization of CPEC regardless of the ten thousand committed troops hired. The vast network of projects across the whole state will need extra resources, especially the road networks and infrastructure meant to pass the Northwest region, where the presence of non-state actors and belligerents is dynamic. With so many important projects and the major Gwadar harbor development, the western part of Baluchistan province is the most insecure and dangerous place (Hussain, 2017). Thanks to foreign state meddling, the Baluchistan province finds itself in the most terrible part of the planet. Chinese laborers and engineers have been attacked and kidnapped on many

times in both the past and the present with an aim of undermining these enormous enterprises. To guarantee the safety of Chinese workers and CPEC projects in Pakistan, the government has assigned a Special Security Division of fifteen thousand regular armed forces troops and six thousand paramilitary recruits. Two successive deployments of this kind have been undertaken. All provinces have politely asked that the government of Pakistan hire more security forces regiments, including police force, paramilitary, and army soldiers, thereby guaranteeing the successful completion of this large-scale project and ensuring total security (Hussain, 2017). The author of this paper underlines the major security issues and higher hazards connected with the CPEC megaproject.

Indian Trepidations

The major influence of China's CPEC investment on connectivity has India confused and dis-oriented right now. Beijing's large investment in Islamabad and, more especially, its recent decision to provide significant sums for the CPEC, also worry New Delhi. Beijing has also built a plutonium enrichment Kyushu reactor for Pakistan's sake. The Chinese will also reveal the sale of eight submarines for \$5 billion, so greatly improving the Pakistan Navy's capacity (Dawn, 2016; The Express Tribune, 2017). New Delhi has clearly raised and stated its shouts of discontent with the strategic and financial cooperation between Pakistan and China. During his visit to Beijing, N. Modi, the Prime Minister of India, advised the Beijing president about the building of the CPEC project. China, though, disregarded the tension and decided to carry on with the project. India also finds unsatisfactory the operations, development, and control over China of the Gwadar harbor (The Express, Tribune, 2017). Actually, New Delhi is deeply involved in the conflict in Baluchistan, a hydrocarbon and gas-rich area. Due in part to the recent example of Kulbhushan and its network as well as inadequate law and order conditions, work and development efforts in Baluchistan have also been suspended. Thanks to the CPEC, China's influence is growing while Russia has greatly raised its capacity to recover total control over Central Asian states. New Delhi says it wants to spread its influence throughout and promote growth and advancement. Main goals of New Delhi are to oppose the CPEC and make a presence in central Asian governments. For these reasons, they have created a corridor from the north to the south via Afghanistan and finally reaches central Asian states (CAR). All of these could be realized thanks to the Iranian port of Chabahar (DAWN, 2017).

Gilgat-Baltistan disputed territory, Indian traditional stance, and their strong reservations that the CPEC passes through contested areas between Pakistan and India, as well as the US Defense Secretary's perspective that the CPEC project is passing through disputed territory, so violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Indian state. Currently gaining support from the United States, India is opposing the SDGs, which cannot be seen as

global since that Afghanistan is under Pakistan (DAWN, 2017). China built the Karakoram Highway upon crossing Gilgit-Baltistan in 1974. Since 1974, the Indian government has not seen any cause for fear or criticism; now, the CPEC project has unannouncedly raised questions (Daily Times, 2016).

Still, in New Delhi, South Asia, they exert pressure and are more likely to back the United States to challenge Chinese hegemony. They also reject Pakistan's several initiatives in Afghanistan aimed at fostering regional stability and solidarity, which would surely go south. Afghanistan has acquired its support hence it is now in line with the United States. Every one of these countries wants to discredit Pakistan's chances for development and expansion (Daily Times, 2017). Due to the disputed region between Pakistan and India, the bus agreement— which started from Gawadar to Kashgar in China—has lately attracted strong doubts (Daily Mashriq, 2018).

Likewise, this large-scale project is seriously threatened by the clear opposition of the Indian political leadership to the CPEC. At a May 31 press conference, Indian federal minister for international affairs Sushma Swaraj said that Prime Minister Narendra Modi forwarded New Delhi's worries over the CPEC to Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, who later branded it "unacceptable." 2016: Dawn On May 5, the Pakistani armed forces gathered at the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi to confirm that RAW was in charge of the terror acts carried out in Pakistan (Dawn, 2017). Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry revealed during a May 14 press conference that Pakistan knew of India's activities against the project and its methods for undermining the whole initiative. Declaring that the CPEC is merely a project for economic cooperation between China and Pakistan, China has emphatically refuted Indian worries about it. India's worries are baseless. Still, the main goals of Indian intervention and the growing questions about its aims and strategy are to undermine the initiative (Dawn, 2016; Saddique, 2015). The lethal attacks on the World Trade Center before and after 9/11 shaped Indo-Iranian cooperation in many fields, including naval cooperation in their joint drills in the Indian Ocean. The CPEC (CPGS Report, 2014) could be encouraging India's strategic and financial competitiveness against Iran. Moreover, the possible effects of the confused political and security situation in Afghanistan could be major for the development of CPEC infrastructure in the neighboring areas near Kabul. The CPEC is mostly focused on the antagonistic and harsh relations between the new Delhi and Pakistan, the proxy battles including clashes in and throughout Afghanistan and the presence of the new Delhi in Kabul, and the unfriendly relations between Pakistan and its western neighbor. Russia has also indicated its wish to keep the Caspian Sea area's status quo intact in expectation of a new pipeline's building. Along with direct control over the current paths from the Caspian Sea to Europe and beyond, Dawn, 2016; Sabena, 2014 New

Delhi seems also dubious about Beijing's intentions for the Indian Ocean. Long term, the CPEC project poses a major obstacle to China's and India's ties. New Delhi may have opposed and rebelled against the massive project, then developed geopolitical and economic ties with Afghanistan and Iran. For these reasons, India has been building the Chahbahar seaport in Iran to enable access to central Asian republics. Mullen (2012).

RAW & NDS Engrossment

Stability, regional security, and peace are important criteria for the China and Pakistan (One Belt and One Road) project. A huge and multifarious project, the Pakistan-China massive corridor helps to maintain political and economic stability for Pakistan. India is of great importance so it is unhappy with Pakistan's position as a commerce hub and wealthy state. By encouraging instability and violence, the research analysis wing (RAW) of the Indian intelligence agency has entered Baluchistan to destroy CPEC (DAWN, 2017). Afghanistan is also helping the RAW to launch an insurgency in Baluchistan. Operating in Baluchistan from Iran, RAW agent Kulbhushan Yadav, who was arrested on March 3, 2016, was bent on totally undermining the CPEC. The Indian counterpart also admitted that Yadav was the former navy officer. Furthermore, there is evidence that RAW has set a specific cell at a cost of \$500 billion to undermine CPEC (DAWN, 2017) and is involved in proxies situated in Pakistan. Particularly in line with RAW (DAWN, 2016), the Afghanistan Spay Agency (NDS) also participates in sabotage and good rationing. According to the United Nations study, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has heightened the hostilities between the two competing sovereign states, India and Pakistan (Daily Dawn, 2017).

Indian Media Machination

Furthermore undermining the 46 billion CPEC projects are the Indian media, which generates propaganda and highlights misleading news (The Express Tribune, 2017). Regarding the Indian media, their views on the CPEC might be divided into two categories: fictitious news and narrow-minded ideas and news. For instance, on February 20, 2014 the Hindustan Times ran a factual piece on CPEC. On the other hand, works with a certain viewpoint and titled Exclusive: China claims that the main area of land belonging to Pakistan is Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Published in India today, December 3, 2014, Ananth Krishnan's "A declaration on Tuesday reciting the undecided Gilgit-Baltistan area in (PoK) as Pakistan's," Rand4 notes that despite Indian objections, Beijing is advancing with a grand corridor across the disputed area (The

Express Tribune, 2017). They passed a vital site on the Karakoram highway between the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan with China's Xinjiang, according official Xinhua news organization and state-run news agency of China. China's official posture and position during the earlier period were that it refrained from expressing any opinion on the Kashmir dispute, which India and

Pakistan had to decide upon. India sees this area as a basic part of its land, while Pakistan illegally controls it. Though the executive is objective, New Delhi has voiced growing concerns about the rising Chinese investments in projects in PoK. The idea is that these acts show a change from China's past attitude on this conflict. The first published article declaration, which has caused the great commotion in India: Beijing said that the article "Exclusive: China says PoK area of Pakistan," which caused concern, linked the disputed Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) territory to. Besides, the idea and words are too radical. Waving the strong red rag, the report India addressed China claimed that the indecisive Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) area of Pakistan, as reported by Rajeew Sharma on the First Post in December 2014, clearly revealed: Beijing has yet another cause of conflict and annoyance. Beijing's state-owned and operated media has merely reported the disputed and indecisive Gilgit-Baltistan area in POK as Pakistan in the sixty-seven-year-old Pak-India difference over Kashmir issue. But these were slanted, obtained under cover of India from Pakistan (The ExpressTribune, 2017). Although the Khunjrab Pass, a road of great strategic significance, linked the far western Xin-jiang areas of Beijing with Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) for the winter season, the state-owned and run Xinhua news agency of China identified the Karakoram highway pass as a strategic node for linking Beijing Xinjiang with Gilgit-Baltistan. Since the government-run and controlled media in China is entirely state-owned and state-run, it is rather improbable that it will make a mistake in deciding the borders of world states (The Express, Tribune, 2016). The assessment balloons were the Chinese state-run and limited press and media used to gauge the tolerance of the embattled state and guide reaction development. Beijing gently rejects such press and media coverage and offers a small apologies should the reaction from the under attacked state compromise Beijing's diplomacy. With Pakistan and China at last completing the game-changing multi-billion-dollar Economic Corridor project, which crosses through sections of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, the offensive Chinese posture has suddenly changed. This project calls for the building of a four-track road connecting independent republics. The project had a foundation stone put for it.

The CPEC strategy is expected to constrain New Delhi. When the two nuclear neighbors were not given the status of nuclear-armed powers, as part of a pincer policy, they had historically engaged in war and maintained great hostility toward India. Though it cannot cause any damage, the CPEC drawing has caused a lot of fear and uncertainty in New Delhi. The conclusion about the infrastructural connectivity with Islamabad Beijing might be encouraging self-objectivity and gaining points since the proposed CPEC will eventually expose China to risks unique to China. Attacks on the restive mostly Muslim-dominated Xinjiang province in China are being carried out by terrorists from Pakistan-based non-

governmental entities. Still, Chinese statecraft put many remedies in place to minimize these and many more possible negative effects before the CPEC project started (Daily Times, 2017). Consequently, Pakistan is only a component of a pincer strategy in which Pakistan and China are close allies in order to counter India, hence the most reasonable explanation for the most recent Chinese concern and anxiety regarding the designation of a disputed region of Pakistan as "occupied Kashmir". Beijing's displeasure and irritation resulting from Russian President Putin's most important diplomatic mission to India is evident. In response to the revolutionized start of CPEC and to oppose China, Barack Obama, the President of the United States, has also booked a sudden trip to India as the Chief Guest on India's Republic Day in 2015 (Dawn, 2016). Still, it is a reality the hegemonic design of the nuclear armed race and the rivalry among the several South Asian governments have imposed. To improve its nuclear capability, New Delhi has just successfully tested and introduced its Agni-4 missile in a sizable occupied area of China. New Delhi also staged its first Agni 5 test, with a five-thousand-kilometer range. Though China and India's mutual relations may well be antagonistic, India has seen all of these activities in relation to the nuclear build-up as problematic from a strategic standpoint. According to the whole commentary, New Delhi not only shows concern over Pakistan-China alone but also there is a strong possibility of a pincer structure between Pakistan and China being used against New Delhi (Daily Times, 2017).

India development of Chabahar to counter CPEC

Currently located 72 kilometers from the Gwadar port in Pakistan, the Iranian Chabahar seaport The Chabahar marine port originates in the southeast corner of Iran's province of Sistan-Baluchistan. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the political scene of the world changed entirely. As Iran and India have started, experimented with, and extended their naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, they could thus grow ever more dependent on one another. Still, on May 20, 2015, Iran and India satisfied a postponed Chabahar sea port pact to boost regional trade. New Delhi has implemented major steps in sequential order to advance the Chabahar maritime port. Strategically close to the Iranian border, this port also provides a convenient access to landlocked Afghanistan, central Asian governments, and Indian interests. Both sovereign entities formally decided in 2003 to start Chabahar Sea Port's refurbishment and expansion. Though the United States' harsh policies on Iran and its nuclear enrichment activities hamper the progress and extension of the Chabahar Sea Port, The situation has since improved; the USA P+5 states' economic sanctions on Iran based on its nuclear enrichment and expansion of nuclear capability program have disappeared. India thus has chances to benefit from the present competitive scene. India have also built a road between Chabahar to Kandahar. India's strong trade with Kabul

has entirely avoided Islamabad, allowing New Delhi to join other Central Asian governments. This is so because Russia and the C.A.S. directly have access to Kabul's mineral riches. Along with non-state actors and Taliban iron grasp areas in Kabul, this Chabahar corridor—which has not yet escaped Islamabad—requires a major agreement of interests between Afghanistan and Iran (Afzal, 2015). Because the port of Chabahar in Iran is strategically located in the Central Asian area, where Indian commodities are easily available and marketable, New Delhi gives great weight and preference on it. It is also directly investing in Kabul to become a major actor in the area. Though Islamabad does not provide a direct path to Kabul across its territory, the seaport's strategic and geological features are major determinant of its importance in the Arabian Ocean (Afzal, 2015).

Actually, Chabahar will worsen the instability and damage to the Gwadar port. Despite the great aspirations and possibilities Beijing and Islamabad anticipated from the CPEC, the most challenging projects for both sovereign governments are the declining law-order conditions, separatist activities, and upheavals in Baluchistan. After the total departure of foreign soldiers from Kabul, the port of Chabahar in Iran will directly offer a strong basis for the economy of New Delhi to establish its presence in the Arabian Ocean (Fatima & Jamshed, 2015). Still, India might want to start talks with the US to set and speed trade activities at Chabahar and remove sanctions on Iran. Following the signing of the Iran nuclear agreement with the United States, New Delhi was intending to allocate eighty-five million to the port of Chabahar in order to acquire a multi-purpose berth, an established container terminal, and easily accessible technological equipment p. 5. Shah (2015) projects that the yearly running expenses will come to \$22 million. Generally speaking, Iran and India have set aside significant funds to advance the port of Chabahar. By a six hundred-kilometer route, Chabahar port is immediately connected to North-Zahidan in Iran. Built at a cost of one hundred million by the southwestern province of Nimroz Kabula and the new Delhi, the two hundred-kilometer Zaranj-Delaram road can be easily expanded to link with the port of Chabahar and is situated seven hundred kilometers from the southern regions of Iran. Iran has also started building a railway system spanning Chabahar to Zahidan province. Furthermore linked to the C.A.S. is the Iranian railway system. For these reasons, Chabahar Port has lately provided an other path, and Kabul has also signed a tripartite trade pact with Iran and New Delhi (Ayaz, 2015).

United States Apprehensions

China now ranks second most dominating country in terms of economic growth and improved military capability, so posing a major threat to the hegemonic ambitions and influence of the United States in the Middle East and South Asia. If China uses the economic corridor—the deepest seaport in the world—to

materialize as a military base for strategic goals, it has the ability to question the US military power standing in Asia (The Express Tribune, 2018). The most recent U.S. action to unite the states of South and Central Asia under the newest office in the State Department has enhanced the ties between India and Central Asia. Fundamentally, though, the United governments is trying to divert the Central Asian territory off the Russian and Chinese paths and bring it closer to the South Asian governments. Policy stakeholders from the United States claim that a range of collective and shared national interests limited the developing new joint venture between New Delhi and Washington. Among these objectives were "preventing Asia from being dominated by a single, solitary power that has the capacity to displace other states and that may make antagonistic claims of national self-interest to terrorize US existence, US alliances, and US relations with the regional governments." Actually, the United States's approach of strengthening its most recent global ties with India is a calculated attempt to find whether the growing Asian environment is fit for the national interests of the United States in the twenty-first century (The Daily Times, 2017). After the Soviet Union fell, world politics moved from bipolar to unipolar; but, the World Trade Center attacks showed a notable shift. In the frontline state combat against terrorism with the United States, Islamabad was essential. The United States of America has two main goals in this area: one, to prevent the crimes of the Kabul Tali-ban and non-state actors; second, to handle Iran's nuclear enrichment initiatives and the related risks. Second, China's economic control also hinders its capacity to become a rich country, which shapes the whole world economy. The United States of America has developed commercial ties with New Delhi in an attempt to limit China's capacity to impose its monopoly in South Asia. Given Islamabad's geo-strategic relevance in terms of commerce and security, both China and the United States have tried to meddle and shape this nation-state. (bilal, 2014). In his most recent comment on the CPEC, he confirmed the Indian story by telling Congress of doubts about the transit of the CPEC through a disputed area under the Trump presidency. James Mattis recently said of the One Belt, One Road that it passes through an area of uncertainty. Furthermore, I think it illustrates the fragility of trying to impose such kind of control.

Michael Kugelman, a senior associate at The Wilson Center and a US expert on South Asia, tweeted later expressing his surprise at the comment: To give them a picture of the present state of affairs in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area, Mattis has visited the House and Senate armed services committees. Apart from voicing doubts about the CPEC, United States military secretary Mattis told the Committee that the US government was publicly against the Beijing One Belt, One Road centrepiece project (The Express Tribune, 2017). But the CPEC, China's ascent, and their hegemony of the world economy have caused the paradigm to move from the

west to the east. To rebalance South Asia, the United States has also adopted the most current pivoting policy in Asia. Actually, the political and financial emphasis and interests have turned to the Asia-Pacific area; sixty percent of US marine and naval command is now militarily directed on this area. In this regard, New Delhi also is a vital partner (Bilal, 2014).

Trade War with China

Because of its proximity to the Arabian and Persian Gulfs as well as the passage of Hormuz, which estimates forty percent of the world's crude is traded among the governments, the port of Gwadar is strategically and economically significant to Beijing. Dawn (2017) claims that the port of Gwadar opens access to South Asia, Central Asia, and the oil-rich Middle East. Usually, analysts talk on America's hostility toward China, which they consider to be negative for world peace (Dawn, 2017). Maintaining the highest suspicion that Beijing is following an expansionist agenda to compromise US interests in the area, the United States To uphold its hegemonic position and limit China, the US used every tactic at disposal (The Express Tribune, 2017). The situation is serious as well as terrible. As seen in the most recent US military defense department assessment, the Pentagon likewise expects China to increase its military outreach for these reasons. Beijing is increasing the bases of its armed forces in Pakistan in order to protect its national interests and offset the US. Generally speaking, Pakistan and China do not waver in their guarantees and pledges on the CPEC projects at all cost (Malik, 2017). The United States claims that the new CPEC agreement between Islamabad and Beijing is far more advantageous since it increases China's access to the global market and so establishes their power and domination inside Eurasia. The new geopolitical ties between Pakistan and China have caused a great death blow to the USA government since they have greatly lost control over their long-standing allies in South Asia. Given their growing reliance on Beijing and their inclination to coincide with Beijing, the United States might be under more pressure to guarantee Islamabad's cooperation in order to forward its objectives in South Asia. Policy-makers from Pakistan faced challenging roadblocks in their attempts to bring balance and equilibrium back into the relationships between Beijing and Washington amid that conflict. While there is much hope Islamabad will get further concessions from China, Pakistan is genuinely worried about the hostile nature of its ties to regard the "Do More" demands of Washington (Hussin, 2017).

Sectarian & Ethnic Issues

Comprising a range of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and sectarian factions following different schools of thought, notably Sunni and Shai, Pakistan is acknowledged as a very varied and heterogeneous country. Usually, the main population of this province is the Muslim community. Still, the Sunni faction dominates the whole Muslim community; almost eighty percent of the members identify

as Muslims. Still, the Shia sect makes about twelve to fifteen percent of the population census. Furthermore, Ahmadis could account for most of Pakistan's population. Ahmadis were identified as non-Muslims under Pakistan's second amendment and the 1973 constitution in 1974. Apart from the demographics of the Muslim community, Pakistan also has a sizable population of non-Muslim minority including Buddhists, Calash, Sikhs, Hindus, Christians, and Parsis. These organizations are acknowledged as not Muslims. Khan, 2017 Baluchistan province has shown out as the CPEC's weak point. Separative organizations including the Baloch ethnic-nationalists and the BLA fiercely oppose Chinese investments in this area. New Delhi Intelligence Agency (RAW) is interfering in Baluchistan to stop violence driven by sectarianism. Directed against the CPEC, Kulbhushan is the most recent example of such an attack. On the other hand, none of any Pakistani intelligence agency could actively support terrorism or sectarianism. Still, the truth is that "it is raw." From the start, New Delhi has failed to truly acknowledge Islamabad as a state and has sought to sabotage any development activities, even if the Pakistani intelligence agencies merely blame the foreign interests of fostering sectarianism and terrorism in order to compromise the peace. How New Delhi contributes to the spread of terrorism, sectarianism, and insecurity inside Pakistan. Intelligence services of Pakistan have gathered significant proof on the intervention in New Delhi. It also has proof that Delhi is helping sectarian groups in Baluchistan to stop the province's growth.

Maliha Lodhi (Khan, 2017) claims that Islamabad has decided to handle the issue internationally in order to uphold national integrity and solidarity by means of this approach. A major part of the larger sectarian struggle in Pakistan, Baluchistan has seen an exponential rise in sectarian militancy and violence over the past ten years. In Baluchistan, sectarian violence has mostly directed against the Shia community—especially the Shia Hazaras. Identifying itself as anti-Iran and anti-Shia, militant group Lakshkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) The Pakistani government has charged LeJ in recent years of keeping a strong ties with the Taliban. LeJ also oversees all major masterminding of armed strikes on targets of Pakistan state. The extreme sectarian strife claimed the life of LeJ commander Malik Ishaq in a police station in July 2015. LeJ Baluchistan's leader, Usman Saifullah Kurd, was killed by security personnel in February 2015 The killings of Kurds and Ishaq point to a change in the relationship between Pakistani security forces and the LeJ; attacks on Shia Hazaras in Baluchistan have dropped. The LeJ's illegal actions must be stopped if the CPEC is to move forward. Furthermore negatively impacting the CPEC is sectarian violence (Hassan, 2016).

Another important element causing the continuous tensions between the two countries is the participation of the Afghan Taliban in the encouragement of sectarianism. Actually, the Tali-

ban, who received assistance from Pakistan, are not only hunting Shias in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan. The situation worsened even more when the Taliban killed Iranian officials in northern Afghanistan in 1998. Actually, several well-known Shia leaders were killed in terrorism acts. Twice besieged, the Iranian consulate in Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, exposed clearly signs of sectarianism in India. Besides, a senior Iranian official was kidnapped from Peshawar in 2009. Iran could clearly see that Saudi Arabia and Islamabad were funding the groups behind this attack both politically and monetarily. Pakistan was also under fire for neglecting to provide Iranian envoys adequate security tools (Dawn, 2016). This led to the development of links between Pakistan-Saudi Arabia on one side and contacts between India and Iran on another. India clearly wants to have a relationship with Iran; this would isolate Islamabad and lessen its power over Kabul. Two major worries for Islamabad are the development of the Chabahar port by Kabul and the deepening ties between India and Iran (DailyTimes, 2017). Still, when Indian intelligence operative Kulbhushan Yadav was arrested in the Baluchistan area in 2016, Pak-Iran ties changed significantly. It was said he had tried to enter the province via Iran. Thus, the detention of Lt. Gen. Asim Bajwa, an Indian spy agent serving as an officer, exposed the language of the former COAS of Pakistan, General Raheel Shareef, during the visit of the Iranian President to Pakistan: "There is a single concern that RAW (the Indian intelligence agency) is intervening in Pakistan, particularly in the province of Baluchistan, but it also exploits the earth of our neighboring Iran." Furthermore, the most outstanding TTP member, Mullah Mansour, was killed near the Iranian border in 2016. Mansour had lately crossed the border and was suddenly hit by a drone attack, hence the Pakistani military was unsure about his identification. Baloch insurgents, false Taliban fighters, and narcotic smugglers also find their way across the Baluchistan border. Actually, these dynamics have greatly increased the mistrust between the two sovereign country governments (Daily, Times, 2017). Ethnic conflict Since the start of the most recent armed rebellion in 2006, the great number of Baloch nationalist teachers—especially Urdu-speaking ethnic Punjabis known as "settlers" in the province—have intimidated, killed, and attacked most of non-Baloch people. Their goal and security issues, however, drove them from Baluchistan, which would have led to the almost collapse of the educational infrastructure. Actually, the attack has not just affected Punjabi-ethnic communities; in May 2015, more than twenty Pashtun laborers were kidnapped under gunpoint and killed (Hassan, 2016). Ethnic cleansing and ethno-sectarian policies are two of the most important elements fueling the Baluchistan revolt. Baluchistan's economic corridor debate has added more stress since these policies were judged inadequate to keep the condition of worry under control. Since the CPEC project relates to prior Baluchistan-related big projects, it is expected to becoming

more and more divisive. Actually, the CPEC directly opposes the diverse leaders of the separatist movement found in Baluchistan region. Brahamdagh Bugti, the main member of the Bloch Republican Party (BRP), which is run illegally, was denounced for undermining the CPEC seaport projects notwithstanding his status. They also want the United Nations to organize a poll in Baluchistan to decide its course. Ayesha (2015) also claims that the Bloch insurgents and separatist movement leaders purposefully targeted extremist and terrorist groups as well as the autonomous democratic political efforts of the Bloch people by using the Pakistani government and armed forces equipment and funds—acquired from the United States and other European states.

Still, Baluchistan is among the most important provinces in Pakistan because of its unique location, which motivated hope among world leaders. Naturally, it will become one of the most important trade centers in the world, connecting China's metropolitan metropolis of Kashgar with Gwadar harbor. For more than ten years, Baluchistan has seen a brutal separatist insurgency and sectarianism; so, Bloch separatists and insurgents opposed the construction of the seaport of Gwadar. They so attacked and kidnapped Chinese engineers as well as wrecked several train lines and gas pipeline supply networks. Apart from its sovereignty, the administration, working with Beijing, started the process of turning Baluchistan into a commercial and business hub. Fearing that Gwadar harbor would grow and Baluchistan would expand, they were in a state of panic; strangers would flood in (Abid, 2015).

Durand Line Issue

The situation of the Durand Line is not only minor and unimportant but also structural, meant to provide stability and permanency in the link between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Regarding boundaries, British viceroy Lord Curzon gave a very thorough lecture at Oxford University in London in 1907. "Boundaries were the primary concern of every foreign affairs office in the moderate and civilized world. they were also the boundary, from which the contemporary issues of peace and war, life and death for the nation-state were suspended" (Bijan, 2009). Three boundary lines were defined and shown on the map while the Sub-Continent's under United Kingdom's control. The Durand border line divides British India and Afghanistan; the McMahon line divides Delhi from China.

The Radcliffe line is the known border separating India from Pakistan. As time has gone on, these border lines have really become the basis of disagreements and strife among various country-states. Kabul insisted that the Durand border line was "obligatory imposed" by the British, not as an internationally acknowledged boundary (Randhawa, 2005). Referred to as the "Great Game among the British and Soviet realms," the Durand border line was set to act as a buffer zone protecting the British India policy of imperialism and countering the Czarist Soviet attack

(Teh-ran Times, September 21, 2008). The border laws implemented in the 19th century helped Pakistan and Afghanistan to declare a proper international border between them as acknowledgement. Furthermore acknowledged as this limit is the United Nations (UN). On both sides of the Pak-Kabul Durand border, the Pashtuns are living in the past as well as the present. Kabul is trying to recover the huge territory that was formerly part of their country; they have never accepted the boundary as an international one.

Actually, the Taliban leadership in Kabul has kept a similar posture, claiming that the Durand Strip border essentially isolates the zones of influence between British India and Afghan authorities. The Afghan officials, who kept influence by sending an envoy for the special mission over the Durand Line, did not like the non-intervention part (Warikoo, 2007). Beginning a century ago in November 12, 1893, when the "Durand Line" was formed and acknowledged as an international border, Islamabad and Kabul's history may be followed. This came about by an agreement between British in united India and Amir Abdul Rehman of Afghanistan. Another name one could use to describe this boundary is Sir Mortimer Durant. Under international pressure, the Durand Line accord was obtained by appeal and pleading of Afghan sovereign Abdur Rehman rather than any other way. They demanded resolution and closure of the frontier between Kabul and the British from the colonial British authority (The Post, May 7, 2008). The British chose Lord Roberts to visit Afghan king Amir Abdulrahman and tackle the long-standing endemic problem of the Durand Line. They received boundaries as well. Amir's lack of sincerity and their delayed strategies until Roberts, the top border commission officer, retired, led to Still, Afghan ruler Amir insisted on Sir Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary, being chosen to settle the border conflict. Afghanistan's next governments then approved the Durand border line agreement as well in the years 1905, 1919, 1921, and 1923 (Amin, 2004). At the same time, it is a false notion and position that the already established agreement has been in operation for one hundred years and that there is no document proving otherwise than its expiration date. Usually, the legitimacy and authenticity of the Durand boundary line started only during the lifetime of the Afghan ruler who approved of it. After Abdur Rehman passed away, his son Habibullah Khan (the descendent and son of Amir) was called by British Viceroy Curzon to an appointment to go over the common accord on the division of borders with British Indian officials. Actually, the Afghan king Habibullah tried to carry out the covenant exactly, as agreed by his father, Amir. Actually, the British ignore the need of carrying out and honoring the obligations in this reaction (Qassem, 2008).

Actually, it has been established that the Royal British India has authority over a good number of the Baluchistan and FATA provinces. Recognized as a self-assurance-building assessment between the British and czarist Soviet kingdoms in the 19th century

was also the Durand border line (Jang, 2008). By formalizing the Durand boundary line agreement in 1893, the British colonial government aimed to seize authority over these areas, therefore fostering control that would have been advantageous in terms of wars and disputes. They also helped the Soviet Union to be restrained. This part of Durandline was next to the northern areas, which were clearly related to the province of Baluchistan under British control (Qassem, 2008). The British thus developed the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) rules to control and distribute these areas, which fit and proper for the times. Conversely, The third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919 had a major impact on the termination of complete covenants and the acceptance of the Durand boundary line in 1893 as well as Rawalpindi 8 August 1919. On November 19, 1921, Afghanistan and British India came to an other agreement that was approved on February 19, 1922. This agreement lacked underlining of the Durand boundary line, which is why the next Afghan governments neglected it. Still, the Durand Line has been central focus during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Exercise of power over border conflicts in 2003 claimed several lives and caused major damage on both sides of the boundary line. Generally speaking, Islamabad has sent 80,000 troops for military and territorial integrity needs on the Pak-Afghanistan border. This is a show of the stances the nation will not adopt for militant, sectarian, or belligerent goals. Actually, this comment has come from major reactions, rage, and aggressiveness (Qassem, 2008).

Societal Issues

Throughout Pakistan's history, the Baluchistan tragedy has been a constant cause of ongoing political controversy. Comprising a total size of about 3,47,190 square kilometers, Baluchistan province lies in the southwest of the nation. With an expected population of 80,00,000—that is, 5% of Pakistan's total population—this area is forecast to include 44% of the country's total land area. Apart from the Arabian Sea, a coastal stripe, the province is also quite near to the frontiers of Iran and Afghanistan (Khan A. S., 2011). Frederic Grare painted the Baluchistan crisis as follows: "It kept out-sized amounts of aluminium, gold, silver, coal, platinum, copper, and, primarily, uranium. For a conduit bringing natural gas and LPG from Turkmenistan to Iran and further to Delhi, it is a potential transportation industry (Grare, Pakistan: The Re-surgence of Bloch Nationalism, 2006). With a large number of people identifying as Balochi in terms of race, ethnicity, and culture, the Baluchistan province is extremely varied in nature. Another important ethnic group is the Pashtun one, which lives close to the Kabul border. The Baloch have been used constantly to protect the traditional and customary tribal system all around. The inhabitants of their vicinity are obliged to completely follow the directions and demands of the tribal Malik since he is the source and center of all great power in their particular area. Among the most well-known Baloch lineages

in Pakistan, Mengal, Bizen-jo, Bugti, Zehri, Raisani, Marri, and Hasni also found presence in Baluchistan. One of the provinces with the most natural resource reserves is Baluchistan; nonetheless, it faces many problems and crises. These problems could be readily fixed; instead, as our government shows no care or attention, they are becoming more common even if they are declining. This sad scenario is causing major problems for the people living in this province. Indeed, it is rather surprising that CPEC has been dubbed not only a game-changer but also a fate-changer in order to advance the growth, balance, and help the people of these provinces in leading fulfilled lives. Still, the whole Baluchistan area struggles with a range of serious issues including an energy crisis, a severe water scarcity, a lack of hospitals, the threat of unemployment, a drug culture, poverty, and inadequate supply of educational institutions.

Conclusion

The surrounding countries of Pakistan view the endeavour as unsuccessful because of their underlying animosity, grudges, ill-will, and jealousy. Their constant meddling blocks the whole development of the initiative. India is constantly trying to discredit the project by supporting a sizable number of militant groups so as to attack the corridor in search of weaknesses. Since the start of the project, security considerations have dominated all other ones. External elements are supporting militant organizations and anti-Pakistani separatists. A great number of Chinese laborers have died on Pakistan's CPEC project. The opponent of the initiative is working tirelessly to make it failed. It hinders the project's progress. To handle the matter quickly, Pakistan Army has set up a special security section with 10,000 troops. One other security issue related with the project is small Bloch components. Since Bhugti passed, the people of this tribe have been in revolt. The fact that most of the projects under progress in Baluchistan do not help the local people makes them already suffering an inferiority complex. Among these projects they consider CPEC as one. They are backing foreign militant groups as local supporters in order to discredit the enterprise since this helps to undercut it. The ruling political party of Pakistan has to settle Baloch complaints so that they may identify as Pakistani and help the project to be completed effectively. Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Suraj spoke at a press conference about India's misgivings about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). India is openly realizing that the initiative cannot be sustained. RAW is always working to undermine a project on economic cooperation between China and Pakistan. China has told India that the CPEC is a scheme between China and Pakistan and should not worry anyone. India is upsetting the whole business since it cannot welcome Pakistan's progress. Recently Pakistan assigned Gawader sea port to China and struck a deal with Iran to finish a gas pipeline. Using the Karakoram Highway and the southern march across Baluchistan, China is distributing electrical

resources throughout central Asia. Russia keeps influence in the Central African Republic because of its current pipeline systems. Europe is also grabbing the energy riches of the Caspian area by building pipeline networks from Tabilsa to Ceyhan ports. Under such conditions, the United States is still distributing Caspian energy resources, however it seems that the process has been postponed in terms of time. The US should launch a campaign aiming at fostering unity and peace all around the area. From the US extra budget of \$236 billion in 2000, a budget discrepancy value of \$565 billion emerged in 2004. The Wakhan corridor's geo-strategic and geopolitical relevance to China drives the United States to keep its continuous war against terrorism and seize its carriers all around. The only nation that has concerns about the whole program is India. Though it has no direct bearing on the corridor, it will gain from the prospects presented by it going forward. Actually, Pakistan is much affected by the Muslim surrounding states, which sit at the crossroads of the strait of Hormuz and the central Asian nations. These consequences have to be resolved in line with the interests of the regional governments. By building the Nicaradua Canal and increasing its naval presence in the North Atlantic, China has not only become a regional power but also increased its geopolitical maneuverability capability in the Atlantic Ocean. Ultimately, the reciprocal cooperation and fair interactions across all regional nations determine the evolution of material prosperity, well-being, and contentment among them.

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